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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 890437-CA

v.
Category No. 2

JOHN BECKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions for communications
fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801 (1990), and unlawful acts by a director, officer or
agent, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-706 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendant's motion for new trial based on either a claim of newly
discovered impeachment evidence or of exculpatory evidence being
improperly withheld?

A denial of a motion for new trial is

reviewed only for a clear abuse of discretion.

State v.

Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); State v. Smith, 776 P.2d
929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

2.

Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on

the second degree subsections of communications fraud as
necessarily included lesser offenses of first degree
communications fraud?

Being a question of law, this Court must

review it for correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,

1070 (Utah 1985); Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie &
Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Utah Ct. App. March 2,
1990).
3.

Are the elements of the convicted offenses "wholly

duplicative•• such that defendant is entitled to be convicted of
only one offense?

This is a question of law governed by the

standard of review stated in paragraph 2, above.
4.

Did the trial court err in its instructions to the

jury; and, did defendant preserve these issues by excepting to
the instructions given?

Jury instructions are within the

discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed for
prejudicial error,,

State v. Hansen, 734 P. 2d 421, 428 (Utah

1986); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-920 (Utah 1987).

This

Court must make original legal determinations regarding waiver
and prejudice.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes, constitutional provisions
and rules for a determination of this case are contained in the
appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant John Becker was originally charged in three
separate informations with communications fraud, a first degree
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felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990)
(Second Judicial District Court Case No. 891919454 R. 1-2),
unlawful acts by a director, officer or agent, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 (1990) (Second
Judicial District Court Case No. 891919455 R. 1-2, 9), and theft,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-404
(1990) (Second Judicial District Court Case No. 891919456 R. 1).
The cases were consolidated for trial on the basis that the
charges were part of a single criminal episode (R. 34-35).

On

April 5, 1989, jury trial commenced before the Honorable Stanton
M. Taylor, Judge, Second Judicial District Court, Weber County,
State of Utah (R. 50). On April 12, 1989, the jury returned
verdicts of guilty to the lesser included offense of
communications fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(e) (1990) (R. 74), guilty of
unlawful acts by a director as charged (Case 891919455 R. 21),
and not guilty of theft (Case 891919456 R. 25). On May 15, 1989,
defendant filed a motion for new trial based on a claim that the
prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence which constituted
newly discovered impeachment evidence (R. 154-186).

The motion

was denied on June 5, 1989 (R. 193). Defendant then moved the
court to consider reduction of the offenses under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990) (R. 144). At the time of sentencing, the

The district court has forwarded three record volumes numbered
respectively to each of the three original informations.
However, for the most part, all pretrial, trial and post-trial
records are in the main volume, Second Judicial District Court
Case No. 891919454. Therefore, references to the record will be
to the main volume unless otherwise specifically noted.
-T-

court reduced the conviction on communications fraud by one
degree to a third degree felony, and withheld imposition of
sentence on the offense of unlawful acts by a director (R. 153;
Case 891919455 R. 26). On May 22, 1989, defendant was sentenced
to a single sentence of zero to five years at the Utah State
Prison (R. 153). A determination of restitution was reserved by
the court (R. 213). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June
8, 1989 (R. 206).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
White Oil Company, Ogden, Utah, was a retail gas
service company started by Peter White in 1953, and purchased by
the Callister family in 1964. The Callisters renamed the company
Mountain Oil (T. 41). Defendant Becker had been employed by
White Oil and continued as the bookkeeper for Mountain Oil (T.
45).

Mountain Oil consisted of five gasoline service stations

with convenience stores in the Ogden area. A warehouse, service
station and the main office, where defendant worked, were located
at 2520 Pennsylvania Ave., Ogden, Utah (T. 42-44).

At the time

of trial, Mountain Oil was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a direct
result of this case (T. 42).
In 1964, Allen and Paul Callister were the officers of
Mountain Oil, Robert Dalton was the office manager and defendant
was the bookkeeper and "second in command" (T. 45, 63). In 1969,
Allen Callister died.

Paul Callister became president and

another brother, Jan Callister, became vice-president (T. 47).
Dalton was subsequently made a director and given a share of
stock (T. 47, 515). In 1979, defendant was made a director and
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given a share of stock (T. 47, 183, 293, 564).
The Callisters were not involved in the day-to-day
operation of Mountain Oil.

Instead, the company was run by

Dalton and defendant (T. 60-63, 181). Beginning in the 1980's,
Dalton was absent much of the time from the office due to alcohol
and other health problems (T. 359-361).

Defendant ran the

company in his absence (T. 63, 361). Defendant had authority to
order supplies, disburse payments, issue payroll and all other
company checks, access the service stations' drop safes, and hire
and fire employees (T. 63). Defendant's authority was the same
as Dalton's, with the exception that defendant was not authorized
to sign for bank loans (T. 60-63, 532, 561). However,
defendant's primary duties were over the financial aspects of the
company.

He was solely responsible for all bookkeeping at

Mountain Oil.

This included overseeing and maintaining records

for all monies received from the five stations, the payroll for
the company, and all accounts receivable and payable (T. 64-65,
70, 318). He was responsible for payment of all employee

The characterization of defendant as a director was contested
at trial. Defendant maintained that he was never a director but
given the share of stock as a valued employee (T. 684-685). The
minutes of the December 4, 1979, directors' meeting support
defendant's claim (T. 208). However, Paul Callister, Jan
Callister and Robert Dalton, all officers of the company,
testified that defendant was a director (T. 46-47, 146-149, 18384, 564-566). The accountant for the Callister companies
testified similarly (T. 293). Additionally, the records
established that defendant paid himself a director's fee of
$150.00 for all directors' meetings after 1979 (T. 79-81). Other
evidence to be discussed clearly established defendant as an
agent of Mountain Oil. For purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10706, the issue of whether defendant was a director, officer or
agent at the time of his unlawful acts, was submitted to the
jury.
-5-

(T. 50-51, 356, 361, 392). They retrieved the monies from the
locked drop safes of each station.

The safes could only be

accessed by keys maintained in the Mountain Oil office (T. 53,
63).

The money, both cash and checks, were counted by Gamble or

Hinds at the Pennsylvania Ave. office (T. 54, 346). The
secretaries checked the amount received from each station with
the shift reports ("TDA's") from each station (T. 52, 347-350).
The shift reports listed all sales for gas and convenience items
sold during a shift.

Each station provided two shift reports per

day (T. 350). The shift reports were maintained in the office
and, at the end of the week, combined for a weekly report of the
activities of each station (T. 351). The weekly totals were
posted by Gamble or Hinds in the sales journal (T. 352). On
weekends, defendant picked up the station monies and either left
the sums in the office or brought them in on Monday for balancing
by the secretaries (T. 666). Once the amounts received and sold
balanced, the cash and checks were given to defendant to deposit
in the bank (T. 352-353).
When defendant received the verified cash and checks
from the secretaries, he usually brought the items into his
office and prepared deposit slips for the bank (T. 303, 352-353).
Neither Dalton nor the secretaries observed what defendant did in
his office.

After defendant completed the deposit slips, the

cash and checks were held in a cabinet behind the office counter
until the bank deposits were made later in the day (T. 357).
Some monies were also held in the office for petty cash.
this latter source from which Dalton took money (T. 536).

It was
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j. Murphy did not

generate new figures for the statement but used defendant's
figures, including sales, income, liabilities and bank
reconciliations, to computer-generate a monthly evaluation of
Mountain Oil's assets and liabilities (T. 242-243, 265-267),

The

monthly financial report was reviewed at the monthly directors'
meetings.

The reports were a "decision making tool", used to

determine if Mountain Oil was making a profit, how the company
compared to other of the Callister holdings and generally what,
if any, future management decisions needed to be made concerning
the company based on its financial status (T. 72-73, 441-443).
The bottom line was to determine the owner's equity in the
company, equity being assets less liabilities (T. 420),
Even before 1979, defendant attended some of the
directors' meetings because of his financial knowledge.

After

1979, the date the Callisters and others testified that defendant
became a director, defendant attended every monthly directors'
meeting (T. 48), During all such meetings, defendant was present
when the financial statements of Mountain Oil were discussed (T.
71-73).

He answered any questions the directors had concerning

the figures and never represented that the figures were not
accurate or based, on true information (T. 73, 85-89, 132, 733).
Specifically, as it relates to defendant's conviction
of communications fraud, Paul and Jan Callister, Robert Dalton,
Donald Murphy and defendant attended the October 21, 1986,
directors' meeting.

During the meeting, the financial statement

of Mountain Oil for August, 1986 was discussed (T. 81-82, 184-
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The financial statements discussed in the directors' meetings
were normally for a previous month as there was some lag time
necessary to gather and prepare the figures.
Beginning in 1985
ai id continuing in 1986, defendant had been taking more time to
generate the figures given to Murphy (T. 312-315).
Despite t.b I s #
defendant refused all offers of help in preparing the books x _.
106) .

Mountain Oil hired two accounting firms to review
defendant's books, and compare the entries to the original sales
records, deposits, bank statements and other documentation (T.
403-407, 439-444),

From this, it was determined that any

alterations in the books could only have occurred through
defendant (T. 423-425, 462, 477-478).

While some discrepancies

occurred at the service station and inventory levels, the only
significant discrepancies were in the office's recording of
assets and liabilities; that is, there were significant
variations in the amounts recorded as having been received from
the stations as compared to what was actually deposited in the
bank (T. 415, 468-469).

There were checks written in the check

register which were never issued, and checks issued which were
never recorded (T. 457, 468-469).

There were no actual bank

reconciliations (balances) done even though represented by
defendant as having been made (T. 96-98, 410, 414, 711, 727).
There were taxes represented on the books as having been paid
which were never paid (T. 418-419).

There was no record of a

$100,000.00 loan received (T. 483). There was no record in the
books of Dalton's I.O.U.'s or any accounting for the cash taken
(T. 461). Defendant did not deny any of the alterations and
discrepancies listed by the accountants; nor did he deny his
responsibility for the false entries (T. 724-733).
It was established that in 1985, $186,000.00 in cash
was received from the service stations which was not deposited in
the bank; in 1986, $221,000.00 was received in cash from the
stations which was not deposited.
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regarding earnings and losses, Mountain Oil owed $588/000•00 in
unpaid taxes (T. 418-419).

Most significantly, based on

defendant's altered books and figures. Mountain Oil appeared in
October 1986 to be worth $1,000,000.00 to $1,006,000.00.

In

actuality, Mountain Oil was only worth $13,000.00 (T. 421-22).
Faced with limited financial worth and approximately one million
dollars of indebtedness, Mountain Oil declared bankruptcy (T.
113-114).
Defendant testified on his own behalf, admitting to
making the alterations and false entries as alleged (T. 724-725).
He admitted that he never divulged the inaccuracies of his
figures in any directors' meeting (T. 733). His explanation for
the missing amounts was that 1) Dalton took money from petty cash
and 2) defendant, when faced with mistakes in the accounts, did
not know what to do (T. 694-695, 703, 710-711, 725-726, 731).
Juxtaposed to defendant's testimony was Robert Dalton's, called
as a defense witness, who testified that at most he took
$14,000.00 from the company (T. 539). Further, one of the
outside accountants had previously testified that the number and
amount of discrepancies in defendant's figures could not be due
to general accounting mistakes (T. 477-478).
There was no evidence presented that defendant had
directly stolen the $408,000.00 of missing cash.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying defendant's motion for new trial as the evidence in issue
was merely cumulative impeachment evidence which would not have
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Here, defendant argues that he should have been granted
a new trial on two grounds: 1) that the prosecutor withheld
exculpatory evidence, and 2) that the evidence withheld was newly
discovered evidence (Br. of App., Pts. I and II).

Neither ground

has merit.
1.

Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence

There is no question that a prosecutor has a due
process obligation to disclose even unrequested evidence which is
exculpatory.

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988);

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985); State v. Jarrell,
608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980).

Further, even if not exculpatory,

once a prosecutor voluntarily complies with a specific discovery
request, he has a continuing duty to disclose pertinent requested
information.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-917 (Utah 1987).

Here, defendant claims that the prosecutor violated
these discovery obligations in failing to reveal that Robert
Dalton had entered into a civil settlement with the Callisters.
Defendant asserts not only that he specifically requested this
information but also that the information was so determinative of
Dalton's veracity so as to be exculpatory.

Defendant's position

is factually not supportable.
Defendant did make pretrial discovery requests, but as
to Robert Dalton, only the following could be reasonably
construed to have been requested:
1.

Copies of any written or recorded
statements of defendant or "any
codefendant" (R. 5, Request 1) and of
Dalton specifically (R. 47, Request 4 ) ;
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yet did not question either the Callisters or Dalton about them.
If defendant thought the matter was relevant, he had a duty to
inquire concerning any agreements between the witnesses apart
from any agreement with the state.
224-225.

State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d at

The matter was certainly not being hidden by anyone.

Dalton's attorney represented, in open court in Dalton's case,
that the matter was being negotiated (R. 184-186).

But while the

witnesses had initially agreed to the settlement, that agreement
still required the approval of the bankruptcy court, which
approval was not received until approximately May 24, 1989 (R.
178).

Under the facts of this case, the jury had all pertinent

information from which to fairly evaluate Dalton's credibility or
bias.
2.

Newly Discovered Evidence,

Defendant correctly cites Utah case law defining "newly
discovered" evidence which might justify a new trial.

State v.

Worthen, 765 P.2d at 850-851. But, defendant ignores the fact
that impeachment evidence, or evidence merely cumulative of the
trial evidence, cannot normally serve as a basis for a new trial.
Id. at 851. Accord State v. Conrad, 590 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Utah
1979); State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438, 450 (Utah 1973); State v.
Jiron, 492 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1972).

To justify the granting of

a new trial, the questioned evidence must be "sufficiently

Defendant argues that Dalton was a State's witness because he
was subpoenaed by the State. Legally, such a conclusion is not
justified and factually, it is unsupportable. Dalton stated that
while he agreed to testify if subpoenaed, he was not subpoenaed
by the State (T. 518). Dalton testified he appeared because the
defense requested him to appear (T. 515).
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Ii l response to a bi 11 of particulars, the State fully
defined t h e basis of the communications fraud.

Defendant was •

i :n formed:
(l)(a,
fendant Becker communicated
the board of directors of Mountain Oil
Company on October 2 1 , 1986 by submitting a
financial report for August 1986, which w a s
fraudulent and did not represent the true
financial condition of Mountain Oil Company
(b) Said f inancial report w a s € •: cair i i :i = • I
bj defendant and directors Paul Call :i s te •] :,
Ja i i Callister and Robert Dalton at 2520
Pennsylvania A v e n u e , Ogden, Utah on October
21 , ] 986.
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(d) The loss to Mountain Oil Company
for August 1986 was $35,832.07 and a total of
$221,617.71 for the year 1986.
(e) The financial report for August
1986, discussed at the October Board Meeting,
reflected a profit for the month of August
1986, of $3,402.00, and a profit for 1986
year-to-date of $54,000.00.
(f) Defendant Becker admitted on a
number of occasions to altering the books in
numerous different ways in order to conceal
losses of the company and monies that had
disappared [sic] from the company. These
methods included; (a) altering payables, (b)
altering receivables, (c) not including
significant items that should have been
included in the financial reports, (d)
altering bank reconciliations, (e) improperly
recording deposits, (f) improperly accounting
for the loans, (g) not recording checks that
had been issued and paid, (h) recording
checks that had not been issued and paid, (i)
altering cash balances, (j) and other
accounting alterations that the prosecution
may not be aware of at this time.
(g) The value of the losses covered by
the financial statement alterations and the
bookkeeping alterations total approximately
$900,000.00. For the years 1985 and 1986,
the actual cash losses that were concealed by
defendant's book alterations total
approximately $400,000.00.
(h) Any cash taken, losses incurred or
books altered were all the property of
Mountain Oil Company.
(R. 37-38).
Despite this, defendant claims that it was improper for
the trial court to instruct the jury on communications fraud as
second degree felonies under both Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801(1)(d) and (l)(e).

Defendant concedes that subsection (l)(d)

(second degree felony communications fraud which has as its
object more than $10,000.00 but less than $100,000.00) is

-90-

necessarily included as a lesser offense of subsection (l)(f)
(first degree felony communications fraud which has as its object
more than $100,000.00), as the two subsections merely differ in
monetary amounts.

But, defendant argues that subsection (l)(e),

also second degree communications fraud, is a "lateral" offense
because its object is obtaining something other than monetary
value (Br. of App. at 18-19).

(See Appendix for text of

statutory provisions.)
In support of his argument, defendant appropriately
cites State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1989), but fails to
include the controlling cases of State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152
(Utah 1983), and State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982).
Instead, defendant mischaracterizes two cases as being applicable
which have no bearing on the issue, State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221
(Utah 1986), and State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1986).
Presumably, defendant meant to cite State v. Hansen,

734 P.2d

421, 427 (Utah 1986) (overruling State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577
(Utah 1983), as it construed lesser offenses of felony-murder
statute), and State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1984) (if
criminal conduct is subject to overlapping statutes, the more
specific statute governs).

Further, defendant totally ignores

the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(c) (1990) which
defines a lesser included offense as being so "when specifically
designated by a statute as a lesser included offense."

As such,

defendant's legal predicate for his argument is askew.
The communications fraud statute is set up no
differently than the theft statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
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(1990) and Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-412 (1990).

What constitutes

theft is defined by § 76-6-404, but the degree of penalty is
defined by the object of the theft under § 76-6-412.
Appendix for text of theft provisions).

(See

Theft may be a felony or

misdemeanor depending on the amount of money taken.

But, theft

may also be a second degree felony if the property stolen is a
firearm or a motor vehicle; or may be a third degree felony, if
the defendant has two prior misdemeanor theft convictions or if
the property stolen is a "stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow,
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny,
swine, or poultry".

The theft statute does not fit the "Venn

diagram" defendant proposes (Br. of App. at 19).

Yet, it is

clear that the legislature intended theft to be generally
inclusive, with the object of the theft only relevant for
determining the degree of the offense for purposes of punishment.
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) generally describes the
elements of the crime of communications fraud while subsections
(l)(a)-(f) describe the punishment based on the goal or purpose
of the scheme.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the legislative intent to
make subsections (l)(a) through (l)(e) lesser included offenses
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(f) is not clear, subsection
(l)(e) still qualifies as a necessarily included offense of
subsection (l)(f).

Here, the same evidence was presented for

proof of either subsection (l)(e) or subsection (l)(f), the only
difference being that in the former the jury could convict
without proof of defendant's intent to gain something of monetary
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value.

Additionally, a theoretical view of the two subsections

demonstrates that all the elements of (l)(e) are necessarily
included in the elements of (1) (f), for the elements of the
crimes are identical.

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 154-155.

Accord State v. Young, 780 P.2d at 1239-1240; State in Interest
of L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1982).
As stated in State v. Howell, 649 P.2d at 95, a trial
court may give a lesser included instruction, even over a
defendant's objection, if warranted by the evidence and the
defendant is not prejudiced by lack of notice or preparation so
as to deny due process.

Here, the State's response to the bill

of particulars gave defendant full and fair notice of the basis
of the State's case.
The state never alleged that defendant directly stole
7
the missing $408,000.00.
Instead, the theory of the case was
that defendant, over a period of some five to six years, devised

Defendant maintains that the lesser included instructions were
given over his objection (Br. of App. at 17). What the record
shows is that the trial court, sua sponte, noted it was sure
defendant did not want the lesser included but that the court
felt the evidence justified it (T. 799). However, rule 19(c),
Utah Rules Criminal Procedure, requires a specific objection to
an instruction to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Ayala,
762 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Defendant did not do
so here. It is clear that the lesser included instructions were
not requested by defendant, but given at the request of the
State.
7
Conviction of communications fraud does not require proof of a
theft, as evidenced by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(4):
An intent on the part of the perpetrator of
any offense described in Subsection (1) to
permanently deprive any person of property,
money, or thing of value is not a necessary
element of the offense.

a method of altering the books of Mountain Oil so as to cover up
significant shortages.

Defendant alternatively described his

actions as being done to cover up a $200,000.00 mistake for which
he could not account (T. 725), and to cover up Dalton's thefts
(T. 92-93, 583). The State presented evidence that the missing
monies were not accountable for by Dalton's thefts or general
bookkeeping errors (T. 457-458, 477-478).

Defendant's trial

defense was that he had done the acts but that 1) he did not
personally steal any monies, and 2) he was not an officer or
director of the company for purposes of his other conviction
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 (T. 685, 710-712, 725-731).
Thus, defendant's defense was not affected by the giving of the
lesser included instructions. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459,
464 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).
POINT III
THE ELEMENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND
UNLAWFUL ACTS BY A DIRECTOR ARE NOT "WHOLLY
DUPLICATIVE".
Defendant argues that the elements of the offense of
communications fraud are identical to those of the offense of
unlawful acts by a director such that he should have only been
convicted of one offense (Br. of App. at 23). There are several
defects in defendant's position.
First, defendant never made this argument in the court
below nor objected to the giving of Jury Instructions 11 and 16
now complained of on appeal.

(See T. 781-800 for in-chambers

discussion of jury instructions; T. 488-493 for Motion to Dismiss
on other grounds).

As such, he is now precluded from raising the

n A _

issue on appeal. State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989);
State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 463; In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1289,
1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Second, the trial court did in fact only sentence
defendant for one offense, apparently on the basis that both
offenses were part of a single criminal episode (Sentencing
Transcript at 7-8). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1).

While the

trial court was not required to do so, defendant received what he
is now seeking from this Court, a single sentence on a third
degree felony.
Even if defendant's argument is considered
substantively, it fails.

State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 435

P.2d 146 (1969), restricts the authority of the prosecutor to
charge two duplicative crimes.

But, consistently the Utah

appellate courts have limited Shondel's application to criminal
conduct punishable under two different statutes containing
exactly the same elements, i.e., "wholly duplicative" elements.
State v. Gomez# 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986); State v. Bryan,
709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Here, it is obvious that Utah Code Ann.

S 76-10-706, governing unlawful acts by a director, requires
defendant to be a director, officer or agent of the corporation
and Jury Instruction 16 so instructed (R. 110). On the other
hand, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, communications fraud, does not
require defendant to be in any special relationship to the
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corporation (R. 104, Jury Instruction 11).
Therefore,

State v. Shondel is inapplicable because

the elements of the two statutes in question are not "wholly
duplicative".

Accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

(sexual abuse of a child is not duplicative of sexual
exploitation of a child); State v. Clark, 632 P. 2d 841 (Utah
1981) (theft of livestock is merely more specific and therefore
separate crime from theft);

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161

(Utah 1980) (theft by deception and deceptive business practices
are distinct crimes); Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979)
(presenting a false prescription is not duplicative of forgery).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY;
AND, DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED ANY ISSUE IN
THIS RESPECT.
Points Five, Six and Seven of defendant's brief
challenge the jury instructions given by the trial court on the
grounds that 1) the trial court did not properly instruct the
jury on the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706, unlawful acts
by a director, and did not properly instruct the jury on the
definitions of the terms used in the elements, 2) the trial court
did not properly instruct the jury on the term "on or about" as
used in reference to the dates of offenses, and 3) the trial
court failed to include defendant's instruction on reasonable
doubt.

As to defendant's first two arguments challenging Jury

Q

The State submits that there are other significant differences
in the elements of the two crimes, but that a complete discussion
of all the differences is unnecessary, in light of the
distinctive requirement of being a director, officer or agent
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706.
-26-

Instructions 9-11, 16, and 17, defendant raised no objections to
these instructions (T. 781, 785, 789, 796)- Therefore, defendant
has waived these issues.

State v. John, 770 P.2d at 995; State

v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 463; Utah R. Crim. P. 103(a)(1).
As to the reasonable doubt instruction, defendant
requested an elements instruction containing the following
language:
The State Has The Obligation To Prove Each
And Every Individual Element, Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt.
(R. 67). Defendant's proposed instructions did not otherwise
specifically define reasonable doubt (R. 67-71).

During the in-

chambers discussion on the jury instructions, defendant referred
to his elements request and the court responded that it was
instructing the jury that the elements must be found "beyond a
reasonable doubt" which the court viewed as "essentially the same
thing" (T. 800).
Defendant never proposed a reasonable doubt instruction
or objected to the reasonable doubt instruction given.

Indeed,

when defense counsel attempted to subsequently assert that he
had, the trial court stated:
[T]here was no objection raised to the
instruction that was given by the Court. You
have to object. It's not enough to submit
another one. You have to give me some notice
on instructions. It's not enough to submit
something different and then raise no
objection to the one that's given.
. . .

I don't think you preserved your appeal on
that issue.

-27-

(Defendant's Motions Transcript at 17).
Even if this Court were to disregard defendant's
waiver, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in
instructing as it did.

The instruction given is virtually that

of the two instructions given in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,
1145-1146 (Utah 1989).

Unlike Johnson, defendant never proposed

any different instruction to the court.

Nor does defendant even

now complain of the instruction for the reasons addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court in reviewing similar instructions.
of App. at 31).

(See Br.

Under the facts of this case, defendant has made

no showing that the result of the trial would have been different
absent the use of the court's instruction.
harmless.

3jd-

at

Any error is

1146.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for
communications fraud and unlawful acts by a director, officer or
agent should be upheld and his sentence on communications fraud
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/&A

day of May, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

It is important to note that defendant only raised this issue
on June 5, 1989 after the Utah Supreme Court decisions of State
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), and State v. Johnson, 774
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), had been handed down in May, 1989. The
trial court did not have the benefit of these decisions during
trial in April. However, the trial court, in making these
comments to counsel, noted his awareness of the changed views on
reasonable doubt instructions (Motions Transcript at 17).
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APPENDIX

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1801 (1990).
Communications frauds
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme
or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of
value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty
of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the
value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is
$100.00 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the
value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more
than $100 but does not exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the
value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more
than $1,000 but does not exceed $10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value
of the property, money, or thing obtained
or sought to be obtained is more than
$10,000 but does not exceed $100,000;
(e) a second degree felony when the
object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of
something of monetary value; and
(f) a
value of
obtained
$100,000

first degree felony when the
the property, money, or thing
or sought to be obtained is
or more.

(2) The determination of the degree of any
offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property,
money, or things obtained or sought to be
obtained by the scheme or artifice described
in Subsection (1) except as provided in
Subsection (1)(e).

_-an_

(3) Reliance on the part of any person is
not a necessary element of the offense
described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the party of the
perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any
person of property, money, or thing of value
is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for
the purpose of executing or concealing a
scheme or artifice described in Subsection
(1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
(6) To communicate as described in
Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of
information; to talk over; or to transmit
information. Means of communication include,
but are not limited to, use of the mail,
telephone, telegraph, radio, television,
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written
communication.
(7) It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution under this section that the
pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions made or omitted by the
defendant were not made or omitted knowingly
or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 (1990). Unlawful
acts by director, officer or agents
Every director, officer, or agent of any
corporation or association who knowingly
receives or possesses himself of any property
of such corporation or association, otherwise
than in payment of a just demand, and who,
with intent to defraud, omits to make, or to
cause or direct to be made, a full and true
entry thereof in the books or accounts of the
corporation or association; and every
director, officer, agent, or member of any
corporation or association who embezzles,
abstracts, or willfully misapplies any of the
money, funds, or credits of the corporation
or association; or who, without authority
from the directors, issues or puts in
circulation any of the notes of the
corporation or associations; or who, without
the authority, issues or puts forth any
certificate of deposit, draws any order or
bill of exchange, makes any acceptance,
assigns any note, bond, draft, bill of
exchange, mortgage, judgment, or decree; or
who makes any false entry in any book,
report, or statement of the corporation or
association; or who issues any fraudulent,
fictitious, or illegal stock in any such
corporation or association, with intent in
either case to injure or defraud the
corporation or association, or any other
company, body politic, or corporate, or any
individual person, or to deceive any officer
of the corporation or association, or any
agent appointed to examine the affairs of any
such corporation or association; and every
person who, with like intent, aids or abets
any officer, clerk, or agent in any violation
of this section is guilty of a felony of the
third degree.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1990). Separate
offenses agrising out of single criminal
episode - Included offensest
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
• • •

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged
or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. Discovery:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information
of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded
statements of the defendant or
codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the
defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the
defendant or codefendant;
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(4) evidence known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilty of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which
the court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the defendant
in order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense.
(b) the prosecutor shall make all
disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make
disclosure.
Utah R. Crim. P. 30. Errors and Defects:
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.
Utah R. Evid. 103. Rulings on Evidences
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the
context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling
is one excluding evidence, the substance of
the evidence was made known to the court by
offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked.

